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The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious
Link Between Rate and Base
Lawrence Zelenak*
I. INTRODUCTION
There may yet be a flat tax in your future. Although the flat
tax issue did not carry Steve Forbes to the White House,' there is
still strong support-among politicians and among the public-for
radical tax reform. Recent opinion polling indicates almost no one
thinks the current income tax is "basically fine,"2 and in two re-
cent polls the flat tax has defeated the income tax by a margin of
two-to-one. 3 Republican politicians are pushing the issue in vari-
ous ways. On June 17, 1998, the House of Representatives passed
the "Tax Code Termination Act," which would scrap the Internal
Revenue Code on December 31, 2002.4 Although the bill does not
specify the details of the replacement tax, it does indicate that the
replacement should not be progressive and should be imposed on a
consumption base.5 In 1997, Representatives Dick Armey and
Billy Tauzin embarked on a national debate tour; they agreed
that the income tax should be scrapped, but Armey would replace
* Ivey Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Visiting Profes-
sor, Columbia University School of Law. Thanks to Anne Alstott, Barbara Fried, Ed Mc-
Caffery and Richard Schmalbeck for comments on earlier versions of this article.
1 See Ernest Tollerson, Bowing Out: Forbes Quits and Offers His Support to Dole,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1996, at A26 (summarizing Forbes' presidential campaign).
2 See Susan Page & William M. Welch, Things-to-do 1998: Tax Reform Tops List,
USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 1997, at Al (reporting results of USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, that
5% of those surveyed consider the current system "basically fine," and 95% want change).
3 See NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, survey ending Oct. 28, 1997, available in
Nexis RPOLL file, accession number 0291157 (asked their opinion of replacing the income
tax with a flat tax (at 17%), 61% were in favor and 32% opposed); Ann Reilly Dowd, Get the
Facts on Tax Reform, MoNEY, Jan. 1998, at 86 (reporting result of Nov. 1997 Money/ICR
Research poll, in which two out of three respondents favored Dick Armey's version of the
fiat tax).
4 See Ryan J. Donmoyer, In Election Year Gambit, House Votes to Scrap Code, 79 TAX
NOTES 1533 (1998); H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (1998) (Rep. Largent). The House-passed bill
was referred to the Senate Finance Committee on June 18, 1998. 144 CONG. REC. S6563
(daily ed. June 18, 1998). It languished there until the end of the legislative session.
5 H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. §§ 3(a)(1) (the replacement tax system should "appl[y] a low
rate to all Americans"), 3(a)(4) (the new system should "eliminate[ ] the bias against sav-
ings and investment") (1998).
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it with the flat tax, Tauzin with a national sales tax. Republicans
are committed to making fundamental tax reform a key issue in
the 2000 elections.7
Two recent developments have shortened the life expectancy
of the income tax. The 1997 Senate Finance Committee hearings
on Internal Revenue Service abuses generated a tremendous pub-
lic response, and hostility toward the IRS readily translates into
hostility toward the Internal Revenue Code.8 The prospect of
budget surpluses may be even more significant. If tax reform
must be revenue neutral, there will inevitably be taxpayers who
will pay more under the new system, and who will therefore op-
pose reform. Budget surpluses remove the revenue neutrality
constraint, making it possible to compensate those who would
otherwise be losers under tax reform.9 It may now be possible to
buy off the opposition.' °
Although there are several candidates for successor to the in-
come tax, the most prominent is the "flat tax," designed by econo-
mists Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka," and championed by
Dick Armey" and Steve Forbes. 13 The naming of the proposal
6 See Dick Armey & Billy Tauzin, Flat Tax or Sales Tax, A New System Should Have
a Single Rate and Shouldn't Favor Any One Type of Income, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1997, at M5
(announcing the "Scrap the Code Tour").
7 See John Machacek, Paxon, Oklahoman Offer Bill Setting Deadline for Abolition of
Tax Code, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 22, 1998 (available in Nexis CURNWS file) (Rep-
resentative Bill Paxon predicts fundamental tax reform will be a major issue in the 2000
presidential election); Jonathan Chait, The Flat Tax Scam, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1997,
at 23 ("Republicans intend for this new campaign to build through the 1998 or 2000 elec-
tions and culminate in the abolition of the progressive income tax"). As two leading tax
economists have noted, "The odds are that we're in for a tremendous battle over our tax
system... at some time in the near future." JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OuR-
SELVES 14 (1996).
8 See Ronald Brownstein, GOP Lawmakers Are Counting on Making Taxes Pay in
1998 Agenda, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1997, at A5 ("Republicans sensed renewed opportunity in
taxes this fall after the spectacular public response to the Senate Finance Committee hear-
ings on Internal Revenue Service abuses"). Alvin Rabushka, co-inventor of the flat tax,
recently described attacking the IRS as "a strategy that helps sell the [flat tax] issue."
Ryan J. Donmeyer, Flat Tax Strategy: The IRS as Poster Boy for Tax Reform, 77 TAX NOTES
1305 (1997). Conservative economist Lawrence Kudlow agreed that flat tax proponents
should "use the IRS abuses as a launching pad." Id.
9 See Dean Foust, The Partisan Battles Are on Their Way Back, BusINEss WEEK, Dec.
29, 1997, at 80 (quoting an unnamed White House advisor, that "[t]he big political change
[in tax reform] is that you can think about buying off the losers with the surplus").
lo A third development may also bode ill for the income tax. Although the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997)) appears to be a step away from
fundamental tax reform, some reformers see it as the beginning of the end for the income
tax. In their view, the complexity added by the new law "will sow the seeds of the income
tax code's final destruction." Simple, No?, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED Transcript # 97080511-
212, Aug. 5, 1997 (available in Nexis NPR file) (reporting opinion of Rep. Tauzin).
11 ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter FLAT
TAX I].
12 Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060 and S. 1050, 104th Cong.
(1995) (sponsored by Rep. Armey and Sens. Shelby, Craig and Helms).
13 A poll taken in late 1997 asked respondents to choose between the current tax sys-
tem and the flat tax, and between the current system and a national retail sales tax. The
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makes it a curiousity among taxes. Every other tax-income,
sales, property, estate, gift, value-added-is named after what it
taxes. Only the flat tax is named after its rate structure, with no
hint as to what it might be flatly taxing. 4 This approach is not an
accident. Diverting attention from base to rate is good strategy.
The idea of a single rate of tax has considerable appeal to the
American public, but a consumption tax base may be difficult or
impossible to sell on its own. This is especially true of the flat
tax's version of a consumption base, under which individuals pay
tax on wage income but not on investment income.
It is clear why flat taxers believe there is political advantage
to linking a consumption base to a flat rate, and to downplaying
base while emphasizing rate. If one wants to sell a move to an
unpopular tax base, the best approach might be to link the base to
a popular flat rate. But is there any justification beyond politics
for the linkage? As a technical matter, the consumption base and
flat rate features of the flat tax are completely separable. 15 There
is no technical barrier to either a flat income tax or a progressive
consumption tax. If the linkage is justified, it must be because
there is some logical or philosophical reason why support for a flat
tax implies support for a consumption base.
This article examines the politics and the merits of the case
for linkage. It begins with a brief explanation of the Hall-
Rabushka-Forbes-Armey flat tax, placing it in the context of other
(less prominent) proposals for replacing the income tax with a con-
sumption tax. It next examines the politics of presenting the flat
tax's base and rate as a package. The Article then turns to the
merits of the link. It considers the argument that an overriding
concern for efficiency dictates both a consumption base and a flat
rate, a similar argument that an overriding concern for simplicity
dictates both the base and the rate, and more technical arguments
that certain desirable forms of tax neutrality-between present
and future consumption, and among persons with different life-
time earnings patterns-can be achieved only with a flat rate con-
sumption tax. The conclusion is that there is no persuasive case
flat tax beat the current system by almost two-to-one (61% to 32%), but the retail sales tax
barely edged out the current system (47% to 43%). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll,
survey ending Oct. 28, 1997, available in Nexis RPOLL file, accession numbers 0291157
(flat tax) and 0291158 (sales tax).
14 In fact, it is taxing consumption.
15 The flat tax also involves a third innovation, the elimination of personal deductions,
which is also fully separable as a technical matter from the other two changes. However,
the separability of the deduction issue is widely understood, while the separability of the
base and rate issues is not. See, e.g., The National Commission on Economic Growth and
Tax Reform, Unleashing America's Potential: A Pro-Growth, Pro-Family Tax System for the
21st Century, reprinted in 70 TAx NOTES 413, 424-26 (1996) [hereinafter Kemp Commis-
sion] (insisting that tax reform must include both a consumption base and a single rate of
tax, but agnostic as to whether the home mortgage interest deduction should be retained).
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for linking the base and rate issues, and that a well-informed pub-
lic debate on tax reform requires that each issue be discussed on
its own merits. The likely result of uncoupling the two issues will
be a public rejection of a consumption tax base, at least in its flat
tax form.
II. THE FLAT TAX AND OTHER CONSUMPTION TAX PROPOSALS
A. The Many Faces of Consumption Taxation
Under a comprehensive income tax, income is subject to tax
whether it is consumed or saved. Under a consumption tax, only
consumed income is subject to tax. The actual United States "in-
come" tax occupies a middle ground between a pure income tax
and a pure consumption tax. There is no general exemption for
saved income, but there are important instances in which saved
income is not taxable-two of the most prominent being the defer-
ral of tax on unrealized appreciation and the deferral of tax on
qualified retirement savings. 6
A consumption tax can take many forms. Recent proposals to
replace the income tax have advocated four forms of consumption
taxes with very different appearances, despite their underlying
kinship.1 7
The USA (Unlimited Savings Allowance) Tax, proposed by
Senators Nunn, Kerrey, and Domenici, most closely resembles the
income tax.18 As a "cash flow" version of a consumption tax, it
computes its tax base in the same manner as an income tax, ex-
cept that it allows a deduction for all saved income (and taxes all
spending out of savings). 9 Since income must be either consumed
or saved, when savings are deducted from income what remains
as the tax base is necessarily consumption. The USA Tax is
unique among recent major consumption tax proposals in that it is
not flat-its marginal rates range from 19% to 40%.2o The rela-
tively high marginal rates may explain the failure of the USA Tax
to generate great interest with either Congress or the public.
It is possible to tax consumption without involving individu-
als directly in the process. In theory, at least, a broad-based retail
sales tax (RST) would have the same aggregate tax base as a cash
16 I.R.C. §§ 1001(a) (taxable gains with respect to property occur only upon a "sale or
other disposition" of the property), 219 (individual retirement accounts), 401-420 (tax-fa-
vored employer-provided pensions and individual retirement accounts) (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
17 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 196 ("Since these four alternatives appear
on the surface to be very different, their essential similarity is often completely
misunderstood.").
18 USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).
19 Id. § 50.
20 Id. § 1.
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flow individual-based consumption tax, without requiring individ-
uals to file tax returns. A national RST has been proposed as a
replacement for the income tax, and has been mentioned approv-
ingly by Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer.2' A value-added
tax (VAT) resembles an RST, except that a portion of the tax is
collected at each stage of the production process, instead of the
entire tax being collected at the point of retail sale. In a subtrac-
tion method VAT, a business would pay the tax on its total sales,
reduced by deductions for purchases of inputs from other firms,
and for purchases of plant and equipment.22 By the time the sale
to the consumer is complete, the value subject to tax is the same
amount that would be taxed at the cash register under an RST.
Chairman Archer has also expressed interest in replacing the in-
come tax with a VAT.23
Because neither individuals nor families are taxable units
under an RST or a VAT, those taxes cannot be imposed at a higher
rate on the consumption of more affluent persons or households.
For this technical reason, an RST or a VAT-unlike an income tax
or cash flow consumption tax-must be flat.
The flat tax of Hall, Rabushka, Forbes, and Armey is a varia-
tion on a VAT. The flat tax splits the VAT into a two-part tax base.
The business tax portion is the same as the tax base of a VAT,
except that it also allows a deduction for wages and salaries
paid.24 The wages deducted from the business tax are included in
the wage tax portion of the flat tax.25 Since the same flat rate
(19% in the Hall-Rabushka version) applies to both the business
tax and the wage tax, at first the bifurcation of the VAT base
seems pointless. Why remove wages from the base of one 19% tax,
only to tax them at the same 19% rate under another tax?
Actually, the bifurcation serves an important function-ex-
empting subsistence wages from tax. In the Hall-Rabushka pro-
posal, the tax-free allowance for wages is $16,500 for a married
couple, $9500 for a single person, and $14,000 for a single head of
household, with an additional $4500 for each dependent.26 A mar-
ried couple with two children, for example, could earn $25,500 free
of the wage tax. To Hall and Rabushka, the complication of a bi-
furcated tax base is justified by two effects of the exemption
21 See Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales
Tax, 71 TAX NOTES 101 (1996); Dan Balz, Lugar Calls for a National Sales Tax to Replace
Federal Levy on Income, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1995, at A9; Clay Chandler, Archer Calls for
End to Income-Based Tax, WASH. POST, June 6, 1995, at D1 (Archer undecided between
national sales tax and some combination of sales tax and VAT).
22 See CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR., THE VALUE-ADDED TAX 89 (1987).
23 See Chandler, supra note 21.
24 See FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 55-57.
25 See id.
26 Id. at 59, 144. All allowances would be indexed for inflation.
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levels-the insulation of poor wage earners from tax, and the av-
erage rate progressivity produced by putting a flat rate on top of a
zero bracket (wages sheltered by the exemption being taxed at a
zero rate).27 Although bifurcation of the tax base would make
graduated rates on wages technically feasible, the flat wage tax-
in keeping with its name-has only a single rate above the tax-
free allowances.
B. The Flat Tax, Consumption Taxes, and Wage Taxes
There is a close resemblance between the effects produced by
a consumption tax and the effects of a stand-alone wage tax (as
opposed to the wage tax of the flat tax, which is only part of the
total tax base). Suppose a taxpayer has $10,000 in wages, which
he intends to invest at 10% for one year, in anticipation of a con-
sumption binge next year. The tax system is a flat 20% cash flow
tax. Because amounts saved are not subject to tax, he can invest
the entire $10,000. After one year, the savings will have grown to
$11,000. After paying a tax of $2200,28 he can consume $8800. If
the tax system is, instead, a 20% flat wage tax, he will owe $2000
tax in the first year, and will be able to invest $8000 at 10%. The
$800 investment income is tax-free under the wage tax, so he can
consume $8800 next year-the same result as under the cash flow
tax.
There are several caveats to the equivalency between a cash
flow tax and a wage tax. For the equivalency to hold, the tax rate
must remain constant, and the rate of return on the $8000 invest-
ment under the wage tax must be the same as the pre-tax rate of
return on the $10,000 investment under the cash flow tax.29 Most
significantly, the equivalency holds only if there is no existing
wealth (old capital) at the time the tax system is introduced. ° A
wage tax imposes no burden on existing wealth; the wealth may
generate income free of tax, and it may be consumed free of tax. A
cash flow tax, by contrast, does impact wealth in existence at the
time of enactment. Consumption of that wealth-and of income
generated by that wealth-will be subject to tax.
How does the flat tax fit into this analysis? Because it has a
wage tax portion, which is much more visible than the business
tax portion, the flat tax is easily misunderstood as a wage tax.
27 Id. at 89, 123 (exempting the poor from the wage tax), 55 (average rate progressiv-
ity). As I have explained elsewhere, essentially the same results could be obtained with a
value-added tax combined with universal cash rebates equal to the tax on subsistence con-
sumption. Lawrence Zelenak, Flat Tax vs. VAT: Progressivity and Family Allowances, 69
TAX NoTES 1129 (1995).
2s Twenty percent of $11,000; the tax base is tax-inclusive.
29 See Michael J. Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WRAT SHOULD BE TAXED: IN-
COME OR EXPENDrruRE? 161, 172-73 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
30 See id. at 172.
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Considering both parts of the tax together, however, it is a con-
sumption tax, and as a consumption tax it imposes a burden on
old capital. Although the expensing of post-enactment investment
is the equivalent of exempting from tax the return on that invest-
ment,3 ' the business tax does impose a burden on the return on old
capital.32 In other words, the flat tax amounts to a wage tax plus a
tax on old capital. The burden on old capital could be lessened or
even eliminated by special transition relief, but Hall and
Rabushka would prefer, with perhaps too little regard for political
reality, no transition relief.
33
III. POLITICS: THE SELLING OF THE FLAT TAX
A. Hiding the Base Behind the Rate
Despite the tradition of naming a tax after its base, Hall and
Rabushka have chosen to name their tax after its rate structure.34
The name has succeeded, in the sense that public debate on the
proposal has paid more attention to the question of rate structure
than to the question of tax base design. That result is ironic be-
cause their proposed tax base is more innovative than their pro-
posed flat rate.35 Ironic though it may be, the diversion of
attention from base to rate is good politics. Flatness is popular;
exempting investment income from tax is not.
31 More precisely, it is the equivalent of exempting the normal (risk-free) rate of re-
turn on investment. It is not the equivalent of exempting economic rent, monopoly profits,
compensation for risk-taking, and rewards for entrepreneurial effort. See Richard Mus-
grave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NoTEs 731, 735 (1996).
32 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 205 (the business component of the flat tax
makes the system a consumption tax, not a wage tax).
33 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 78-79. They are open to the possibility of allowing
businesses to continue to take depreciation deductions to which they would have been enti-
tled if the income tax had not been replaced. If businesses were allowed to expense all
income tax basis in business assets, in the year in which the flat tax became effective, that
would completely remove the tax burden on existing capital. In that case, however, a wage
tax would more simply accomplish the same economic effects as the bifurcated tax with
complete transition relief for old capital. See SLEMROD & BAKJA, supra note 7, at 175 ("the
more transition relief that is provided to existing assets in the switch to any consumption
tax, the more it becomes like a wage tax").
34 Slemrod and Bakija suggest that a consumption tax base can be considered flat
because it "imposes a uniform, call it flat if you like, tax on current consumption and future
consumption." SLEMROD & BAKJA, supra note 7, at 167. They concede, however, that a
consumption base "is not commonly associated (by noneconomists) with flatness." Id.
35 See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 76 (1986) [hereinafter BRAD-
FORD I] (noting, during the early years of the discussion of the flat tax, that "[tihe quality of
flatness seems to be principally responsible for the considerable journalistic attention" re-
ceived by the proposal, and remarking that flatness has "unfortunately diverted attention
from its innovations other than flatness"); Gerard M. Brannon, What's with this Jazz about
Tax Overhaul? 71 TAx NoTEs 260, 262 (1996) (the flat tax's elimination of the personal tax
on investment income is "a little-noticed feature as well as a big one"); John S. Nolan, The
Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 71 TAX NoTEs 805, 806 (1996) ("the
political rhetoric focuses upon the flatness of the rate of tax, but that is a red herring");
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 167 (the switch to a consumption base is a "more
dramatic and unprecedented" change than amending the rate structure).
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In some opinion surveys taken during the 1996 presidential
campaign, most respondents with opinions favored the idea of a
single rate of tax.36 National opinion was not clearly in favor of a
single rate, however. A poll taken after Steve Forbes' withdrawal
from the campaign found an even split on "a flat-tax system,
where everyone pays the same tax rate no matter what their in-
come."37 When survey participants were given an explicit choice
between "a graduated income tax system, in which people with
higher incomes pay a higher tax rate, or a flat tax system, in
which everyone pays the same rate of tax regardless of income,"
the flat tax lost by 15 percentage points.3 8 More recently, a poll
taken in late 1997 gave respondents a choice between the "current
system in which someone with more money pays a higher percent-
age of their [sic] income in taxes" and a "flat tax system in which
all Americans would pay the same percentage of their income in
taxes." The "current system" won a narrow victory, 51% to 45%.39
As is often true in polling, subtle differences in the wording of
questions lead to major differences in results. The flat tax polls
better against the "current system" than against a hypothetical
"graduated income tax." 0 Jonathan Chait has suggested an inter-
esting explanation of this phenomenon. According to Chait, many
people believe-incorrectly-that the current system has so many
loopholes that it is effectively regressive, despite its nominal
progressivity.4' Ironically, they favor a flat tax because they think
36 Asked whether they favored or opposed "a flat tax system, in which all but low-
income Americans would pay the same percentage of their income in taxes, regardless of
how much money they make," 48% of American adults were in favor and 42% opposed.
Time/ CNNI Yankelovich Partners Poll, survey ending date Jan. 18, 1996, available in
Nexis RPOLL file, accession number 0250300. Asked whether they favored "a flat tax-
with a single low rate for federal income taxes and all or most deductions removed," 50% of
American adults were in favor and 32% were opposed. Princeton Survey Research Associ-
ates /Newsweek Poll, survey ending date Jan. 26, 1996, available in Nexis RPOLL file, ac-
cession number 0250604.
37 The flat-tax system was supported by 48% of respondents and opposed by 48%.
ABC News/Washington Post Poll, survey ending Aug. 5, 1996, available in Nexis RPOLL
file, accession number 0268293.
38 The graduated income tax was the choice of 54%, and the flat tax of 39%. NBC
News/Wall Street Journal Poll, survey ending Mar. 5, 1996, available in Nexis RPOLL file,
accession number 0252528. A different survey, asking an almost identically worded ques-
tion at about the same time, found 54% favoring the graduated tax and 45% favoring the
flat tax. ABC News / Washington Post Poll, survey ending Mar. 17, 1996, available in Nexis
RPOLL file, accession number 0260264.
39 USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, survey ending Nov. 23, 1997, available in Nexis
RPOLL file, accession number 0288901.
40 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 10-11 (citing polling results).
41 Chait, supra note 7, at 24. In fact, the current income tax is effectively progressive.
Whether average rate progressivity is measured with respect to adjusted gross income or a
more comprehensive measure of income, analysis of income tax burdens at different income
levels reveals significant progressivity. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX LIABILITIES FOR FAMILIES BY INCOME CATEGORY AND FAMILY TYPE FOR 1995
AND 1999, at 10 tbl.3, 14-15 tbl.4 (1998).
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that it would increase the tax burden on the wealthy by closing
loopholes.
While it may not be easy to sell the American public on a flat
rate of tax, it appears impossible to sell the American public on
the Hall-Rabushka consumption tax base if the base issue is con-
sidered separately from the rate issue and from loophole closing.
Asked in June 1996 whether they preferred "an income tax system
that taxes both income from investments and income from wages
equally, or a system with higher taxes on income from wages but
no taxes on income from investments," those surveyed preferred
taxing both sources of income, 53% to 31%.42 Interestingly, when
the same question had been asked five months earlier-before
Steve Forbes' strong showing in several primaries had focused na-
tional attention on the flat tax-taxing both sources of income had
been favored by a margin of only 41% to 36%.4' The Hall-
Rabushka tax base did not gain in favor as it gained in familiarity.
In light of the polling data, the decision by flat tax proponents
to sell the rate rather than the base is clearly correct. "The flat
tax" may have a chance with the American public; "the wage tax"
(or even "the wage and business tax") does not. The flat tax propo-
nents have exhibited political savvy in hiding the consumption tax
base behind the flat rate.
B. All Things to All People
Perhaps recognizing that the consumption base issue cannot
be hidden entirely, Hall and Rabushka have also sown confusion
about the nature of the base. Marketing their plan as all things to
all people, they claim that their system "puts a low tax rate on a
comprehensive definition of income,"" and that it "moves toward
the goal of taxing all income once.., and achieving a broad con-
sumption tax."45 Politicians echo their claims. Dick Armey de-
scribes the base of the flat tax as embodying the policy that "[aill
42 NBC News / Wall Street Journal Poll, survey ending June 25, 1996, available in
Nexis RPOLL file, accession number 0259677. The phrasing of the question may be some-
what unfair to the flat tax; it ignores the tax burden imposed on old capital by the business
portion of the flat tax. On the other hand, the phrasing of the question is consistent with
the likely public perception of the flat tax as simply a wage tax. The business portion of the
tax is hidden from public view.
43 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, survey ending Jan. 16, 1996, available in
Nexis RPOLL file, accession number 0249730.
44 Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple, Progressive Consump-
tion Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) [hereinafter Flat
Tax III (emphasis added).
45 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 63 (emphasis added). Herbert Stein has noted that
the flat tax can be analogized to either an income tax or a sales tax, and that "the two
different possible pictures probably contribute to the salability of the plan-one picture
being appealing to those to whom income tax is a bad name and one to those to whom sales
tax is a bad name." Herbert Stein, The Uneasy Case for a Flat Tax, in FAIRNESS AND EFFI-
CIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 102, 108 (Robert E. Hall et al. eds., 1996).
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income should be taxed only once."46 Michael Graetz has com-
plained that the base of the flat tax amounts to putting "dark
glasses and a false mustache" on a consumption tax to make it
look like an income tax.4 7 Graetz thinks that it would be difficult
or impossible to sell the American public on the replacement of the
income tax with a value-added tax, and that the bifurcated base
has "deflected the public from realizing that the Forbes-Armey flat
tax is a kind of value-added tax."4
Just as they claim that their tax base is at once income and
consumption, Hall and Rabushka claim that their rate structure is
at once proportional and progressive: "The good news is that the
flat tax is progressive in that families with higher incomes pay a
larger fraction of their income in taxes."49 Their claims are techni-
cally accurate. When the focus is on marginal rates, a tax system
with one rate above an exemption level is flat; when the focus is
on average rates, the same system is modestly progressive. What
is odd about their claims to both flatness and progressivity is that
they never explain why it is "good news" that the tax is both flat
and progressive. Not only do they never explain why average rate
progressivity is desirable,5 ° they offer a defense of flatness under
which average rate progressivity is objectionable: "The principle of
equity embodied in the flat tax is that every taxpayer pays taxes
in direct proportion to his income. As incomes double, triple, or
grow tenfold, tax obligations double, triple, or rise tenfold."51
Since average rate progressivity violates this "principle of equity,"
one would expect Hall and Rabushka to believe it is bad news that
higher income families would pay a larger fraction of their income
in taxes. Instead they find it good news, perhaps because it allows
them to obfuscate the rate issue as well as the base issue.
In any event, it is clear as a matter of marketing that the rate
structure-in its something-for-everyone guise as the progressive
flat tax-is the attraction and that the base of the tax could not be
sold on its own (not even with obfuscation). The political link be-
tween base and rate calls for an examination of whether there is
an underlying logical or philosophical link as well. Does a con-
sumption base somehow imply a flat rate? Does a flat rate some-
46 Armey & Tauzin, supra note 6.
47 MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INcoME TAX 216 (1997).
48 Id. at 219. Hall and Rabushka claim that the bifurcation of the base is necessary so
that personal exemptions can be introduced into the wage tax. FLAT TAX I, supra note 11,
at 55. As noted earlier, however, the same basic results could be obtained with a VAT and
cash rebates equal to the tax on subsistence consumption. Zelenak, supra note 27.
49 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 124.
5o They do indicate that it is desirable to have exemptions so that the poor pay no tax.
Id. at 52, 89, 123. The flat rate on top of the exemptions produces average rate progressiv-
ity, but this makes average rate progressivity merely a side effect of tax exemption for the
poor, not a policy objective in its own right.
51 Id. at 27.
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how imply a consumption base? Or is there some overriding
principle that implies both? If the answer to those questions is no,
the public debate on tax reform would be better served by separat-
ing the base and rate issues, and considering each on its own
merits.52
IV. DOES AN OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY DICTATE
BOTH A CONSUMI-rON BASE AND A FLAT RATE?
A. Taxes and Deadweight Loss: The Current Income Tax
Taxing any activity drives a wedge between the social value of
the activity and its private value to the actor, and that wedge is a
source of inefficiency. The income tax creates two such wedges-
one for paid labor, and one for saving for future consumption.
Consider first the labor-leisure distortion. If a taxpayer's (T's) la-
bor is worth $100 a day, as measured by an employer's willingness
to pay, a 20% wage tax makes T's labor worth only $80 to T. If he
values tax-free alternative uses of his time (leisure or producing
tax-free "imputed income") at $85, the tax will cause him to choose
an alternative use. By causing T to choose an untaxed use of his
time worth only $85, instead of a use worth $100, the tax has
caused a $15 deadweight loss (also known as an excess burden).53
An income tax also distorts the choice between present and future
consumption, again resulting in deadweight loss. Suppose a tax-
payer has $1000 to consume now, or to invest for greater con-
sumption next year. The social value of investing $1000 for one
year is $100, as measured by the pre-tax rate of return the tax-
payer can obtain. If the tax rate is 20%, his choice is between con-
suming $1000 now and consuming $1080 next year. If he is
indifferent between consuming $1000 now and $1085 next year
(i.e., if he requires $85 compensation to defer his consumption for
one year), the tax on investment income will change his decision
from investment to current consumption. Again, the result is a
deadweight loss.54
52 See Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the Direct
Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 44, at 70-71 (describing
the base and rate structure of the flat tax as "two distinct and separable features," and
setting aside the rate structure to concentrate on the tax base question).
53 Another way of understanding the same phenomenon is to think of the $20 tax
revenue that would be produced by T's labor as a positive externality of T's work. Because
T cannot capture the externality, he produces less than the socially optimal amount of paid
labor when he chooses the tax-free alternative.
54 Both examples in the text illustrate the substitution effect-i.e., the tendency of
taxpayers to substitute untaxed activities for taxed activities. In behavioral terms, the
substitution effect may be partly or wholly counteracted by the income effect-i.e., the ten-
dency of taxpayers to work or save more when they are taxed, to make up for the loss of
wealth caused by the tax. It is often assumed, incorrectly, that a tax causes no deadweight
loss if the two effects are behaviorally offsetting-if a tax on labor income causes no change
in hours worked, or if a tax on investment income causes no change in savings rates. In
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A progressive rate structure has an efficiency cost of its own.
Because deadweight loss from taxation is proportional to the
square of the marginal tax rate,55 the most efficient rate structure
is perfectly flat (for any given tax base and revenue goal). In mov-
ing from a perfectly flat rate structure to an equal-revenue struc-
ture with progressive marginal rates, the increased deadweight
loss from higher marginal rates on more affluent taxpayers will
exceed the decreased deadweight loss from lower marginal rates
on poorer taxpayers.
B. Taxes and Deadweight Loss: The Flat Tax
Thus, there are serious efficiency critiques of both the base
and the rate structure of the current income tax. Efficiency is very
important to Hall and Rabushka, and they invoke it to justify both
their consumption tax base and the flat rate. 6 How well does the
flat tax fare on efficiency grounds? Consider first the base of the
flat tax. It deals with the two tax distortions-between labor and
leisure, and between present and future consumption-very dif-
ferently. By not taxing the return on savings,57 the flat tax elimi-
nates tax distortion in consumption timing decisions. Because the
flat tax continues to tax wages, however, it does not eliminate dis-
tortion in labor supply decisions. The flat tax does not achieve
efficiency nirvana, or even approach it very closely.
Any tax based on behavior will distort behavior, with result-
ing deadweight loss. A tax not based on behavior would be the
choice of an efficiency purist. The standard example of such a tax
is a head tax, imposed in an equal amount on each person solely
on account of existence. In addition to being politically impossible,
however, a head tax sufficient to fund the federal government
would not really be perfectly efficient. The tax could be avoided by
having no income (or assets) with which to pay it, and thus at low
income levels the tax would be based on behavior. The efficiency
costs of what amounts to a 100% tax on low wage earners could be
substantial. Nevertheless, a head tax approaches efficiency nir-
vana much more closely than does a consumption tax.
fact, however, the deadweight loss is solely a function of the substitution effect, and may be
substantial even if there is no change in observed behavior. See HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC
FINANCE 310-12 (4th ed. 1995).
55 See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 376 (1st ed. 1986).
56 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 40-41, 70-72, 86-87 (consumption tax base), and at 84-
86 (flat tax on wages).
57 Although the business portion of the flat tax nominally taxes investment income,
expensing of investment under the business tax has the same effect as exempting from tax
the normal return to capital on new investment. See Musgrave, supra note 31, at 735.
Whether a version of the flat tax with graduated rates on wages would distort consumption
timing decisions is discussed infra text accompanying notes 127-38.
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Even with a head tax ruled out, and with the stipulation that
the choice must be some form of income or consumption tax, a
consumption tax is not the clear winner on efficiency grounds. Re-
call that there are two sources of inefficiency in an income tax-
the labor-leisure distortion, and the present consumption-future
consumption distortion." A consumption tax can eliminate only
the latter. An equal-revenue income tax would have a broader
base, which means it could meet the government's revenue re-
quirements at a lower rate. Compared to the consumption tax, the
lower rate income tax would lessen deadweight loss from the la-
bor-leisure distortion, at the cost of some deadweight loss from the
distortion of consumption timing.
Which system would have less total deadweight loss is an em-
pirical question. The key issue is not, as one might suppose, the
responsiveness of savings to tax rates. Rather, it is whether indi-
viduals have utility functions separable between leisure and other
commodities.59 A pure consumption tax will minimize deadweight
loss only if people "can be described as separating their work and
savings decisions, first deciding how much to work and then how
much of earnings to allocate to provision for the future."60 If that
is not how people behave, then the taxation of investment income
will be necessary to minimize deadweight loss. Although some
economists suspect the condition for optimality of consumption
taxation comes close to existing in the real world,61 the case has
not been proven. Until it is, even efficiency purists must withhold
judgment- on the superiority of a consumption tax to an income
tax; the efficiency link between a flat rate and a consumption base
is not established. It is true that the flat tax involves only one
kind of distortion, while a lower rate income tax involves two, but
the efficiency goal is not to have the fewest kinds of distortion.
Rather, it is to have the least total distortion. By that standard, a
consumption tax is not a clear winner over an income tax.
What about the efficiency case for the rate structure of the flat
tax? Despite its name, the flat tax is not really flat. It actually
has two rates-a rate of zero on the wages exempted from the wage
tax, and a single positive rate applied to the rest of the base. A
truly flat flat tax would be more efficient. Eliminating the exemp-
tions under the wage tax would make it possible to raise the same
58 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
59 See David F. Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy toward Savings, in THE Gov-
ERNMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11, 24-28 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1980) [herein-
after Bradford III.
60 Id. at 64.
61 See id.; Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J.
POL. ECON. S29 (1978).
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amount of revenue with a significantly lower positive tax rate.62
The increased marginal rate on the poor would cause less dead-
weight loss than the loss avoided by the decreased marginal rate
on everyone else. Hall and Rabushka understand this proposition,
but nevertheless call for large exemptions and a correspondingly
higher flat tax rate. Their justification for the high exemption
levels of the wage tax is their conception of fairness.63
Having made this efficiency concession in the rate structure
in the interests of fairness, and having offered little more than
intuition in support of their notion of fairness,64 Hall and
Rabushka have opened the door to others whose ideas of fairness65
are different from their own, and who would strike a different bal-
ance between efficiency and fairness-perhaps involving gradu-
ated tax rates.6 There is no reason to defer to Hall and
Rabushka; nothing in their work indicates that they have any
special expertise in deciding what is fair, or in balancing fairness
against efficiency.
In sum, a single-minded concern for efficiency cannot justify
the flat tax's linkage of a consumption base with a single positive
62 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 81 (indicating the same amount of revenue could be
raised by various combinations of exemption levels and flat rates; as the exemption level
decreases, the revenue-neutral tax rate also decreases).
63 Id. at 52, 55, 59.
64 Id. at 25-29 (discussion of fairness in taxation). This discussion is one of the weaker
portions of the entire book. Three paragraphs consider the implications of various diction-
ary definitions of "fair" (id. at 25-26), as if Noah Webster were the leading authority on fair
tax rates. Hall and Rabushka also offer standard conservative rhetoric likely to persuade
only those not in need of persuasion. For example, "Politicians and intellectuals who sup-
port high tax rates to redistribute income to attain their egalitarian goals threaten individ-
ual freedom and self-reliance." Id. at 28. Their notions of fairness are entitled to little
deference, especially since they contradict themselves on the crucial question of whether
fairness requires progressive or flat average tax rates. See supra text accompanying notes
49-51.
The discussion of fair tax rates in the Report of the Kemp Commission is equally un-
satisfying. The Report asserts that "graduated marginal rates violate the principle of fair-
ness-that if a law applies to citizen A, it must equally apply to citizen B." Kemp
Commission, supra note 15, at 424. The authors of the Report do not appreciate the vague-
ness of the application of this principle to the question of tax rate structure. Under one
interpretation of the principle, it would merely require horizontal equity-that two taxpay-
ers with the same earnings pay the same taxes. A graduated rate structure satisfies that
requirement. Under another interpretation of the principle, it would require that everyone
pay exactly the same dollar amount of tax. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or
Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individu-
als, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995) (arguing the only fair tax is a head tax). The Report
explains neither why proportionality of tax burden is the proper interpretation of the fair-
ness principle, nor why an exemption is fair despite the fact it makes average tax rates
non-proportional.
65 "The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case against
inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of wealth
and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely."
HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938).
66 In any event, the efficiency cost of modest rate graduation-for example, the cost of
having a 15% bracket and a 25% bracket, instead of a single 20% rate-is likely to be
insignificant. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 165.
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tax rate. From an efficiency standpoint, a consumption base is not
clearly superior to an income base, and it is inferior to a head tax,
or the nearest practical approximation thereof. As for rate struc-
ture, a flat rate above a large zero bracket is less efficient than a
lower flat rate with no zero bracket. A relentless pursuit of effi-
ciency cannot explain either the base or the rate of the flat tax, let
alone establish a link between them.
V. DOES AN OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR SIMPLICITY DICTATE
BOTH A CONSUMPTION BASE AND A FLAT RATE?
Simplicity is a major virtue to Hall and Rabushka, and they
claim for the flat tax a decisive simplicity advantage over the in-
come tax .6  They are correct that the flat tax would be simpler
than current law. What they do not say, however, is that the bulk
of the simplification comes from the change in the base of the indi-
vidual tax, and not from elimination of graduated rates. A gradu-
ated rate version of their tax base would be nearly as simple as
their proposal. Moreover, their decision to bifurcate the tax base
to make exemptions possible is a major sacrifice of simplicity in
the interests of fairness; once the decision has been made to have
a bifurcated base and exemptions, the additional complexity of
graduated rates is minor.
A. Simplification: A Question of Base or Rates?
Why are Hall and Rabushka able to fit their tax return on one
side of a postcard, when the current Form 1040 requires two sides
of a full-sized sheet of paper, or many more sides of paper for tax-
payers required to use attachments? It is not because of flat rates.
Of the 69 lines on the 1998 Form 1040, exactly one (line 40) is
devoted to deriving tax liability from taxable income. Most of the
lines are dedicated to the determination of taxable income. Tax-
ing individuals only on wages, rather than on all sources of in-
come, is a major simplification.6" There are three caveats,
however. First, for the 45 to 50 million taxpayers using Form
1040A or Form 1040EZ, current filing already approaches post-
card simplicity.6 9 Second, a substantial part of the simplification
of the tax base comes from the elimination of deductions, which is
a separate issue from both income versus consumption taxation
and flat versus graduated rates. A graduated income tax without
personal deductions would also be simpler than current law. Fi-
nally, the tax base of the flat tax, although simpler than current
67 FLAT TAx I, supra note 11, at 5-6 (the income tax is 'a nightmare of complexity"), 59
(the flat tax's postcard return), 132 (the flat tax will eventually become law "because of the
American taxpayer's demand for a true simplicity").
68 This is conceded by critics of the flat tax. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 47, at 227.
69 See id. at 259.
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law, has its share of complexities. They include: distinguishing
between wage income subject to the personal tax and capital in-
come not subject to the tax,7° the definition of dependents for pur-
poses of the family size adjustments in exemption levels,7 the
need for individuals to file the more complicated business returns
for their small businesses (which could be as small as renting out
a room in one's home),71 the need on business returns to distin-
guish non-deductible personal consumption from deductible busi-
ness expenses,73 the need on business returns to distinguish
between taxable sales and nontaxable interest income, 4 the need
for rules on the aggregation or disaggregation of businesses for
return filing purposes, 75 and the need for complex rules for the
carryover of business tax "losses" caused by the expensing of large
investments.76
With these caveats, the simplification of the tax base of per-
sonal tax returns still would be substantial. By contrast, the sim-
plification achieved by flatness would be less impressive,77 and the
nature of the simplification gains from flatness probably would
surprise most people. The difference in the amount of arithmetic
required to apply one rate or more than one rate to the tax base is
trivial-especially since the tax tables do the arithmetic for most
taxpayers. 78 It may be, however, that a math-phobic public
wrongly supposes the complexity of the income tax flows largely
from the arithmetic of graduated rates. If so, the flat tax label is
well-chosen to take advantage of that misapprehension.
A nontrivial simplification that would follow from a single
rate tax is an end to taxpayers' incentive to shift income among
family members and controlled entities to achieve taxation at
lower rates. 79 This gain would be modest, however, for two rea-
sons. First, current law has already taken most of the fun out of
70 See Musgrave, supra note 31, at 734.
71 See GRAETz, supra note 47, at 227.
72 See id. at 229.
73 See id. at 230; Alan L. Feld, Living With the Flat Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 603, 607, 613
(1995).
74 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 216.
75 See Feld, supra note 73, at 609-10.
76 Loss carryovers cause complications under the existing income tax (I.R.C. § 172
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)), but they would be a bigger problem under the flat tax, for two
reasons. First, expensing of investment will make losses more common. Second, achieving
the flat tax goal of neutrality between saving and consumption requires adjustment of loss
carryforwards to reflect the time value of money and inflation. See Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
The Simplicity of the Flat Tax: Is It Unique? 14 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 283, 294-95 (1997).
77 See Stein, supra note 45, at 103 (flat tax "simplification results almost entirely from
the redefinition of the base and hardly at all from the flatness of the tax").
78 "I have sometimes remarked that, given the existence of rate tables that cover the
vast majority of individual taxpayers, graduated rates should pose a problem primarily for
those with astigmatism." McLure, supra note 76, at 289 n.13.
79 See GRAErz, supra note 47, at 231.
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income-shifting, 80 through the "kiddie tax""' and the compressed
tax rate schedule for trusts.82 Second, only a true single rate tax-
with no zero rate due to exemptions-can eliminate all opportu-
nity for income-shifting. Because of the zero bracket, some incen-
tive for income-shifting would remain under the flat tax."
There is another kind of income-shifting-between years
rather than between taxpayers. Because of the time value of
money, this form of shifting does not require rate differences to be
attractive. Even if the tax rate is the same in all years, there is
incentive to shift income to later years. Hall and Rabushka hint
that the flat tax would put an end to income-shifting between
years, 4 but that is simply not true.8 5
In any event, playing income-shifting games makes sense
only for high bracket taxpayers-a small percentage of all taxpay-
ers-for whom the tax savings justify the transaction costs. Even
for these taxpayers, the complexity is in the nature of a self-in-
flicted wound. The complaint of Hall and Rabushka about the
"nightmare of complexity"86 of current law is that it makes "the
ordinary citizen [feel] overwhelmed and threatened by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service."87 The "ordinary citizen," however, is unaf-
fected by the complexities of income-shifting.88
8o See id. at 231.
81 The "kiddie tax" taxes unearned income of children under 14 at their parents' mar-
ginal rate. I.R.C. § 1(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Hall and Rabushka might respond, how-
ever, that the kiddie tax is itself a moderately complex provision. By contrast, the flat tax
reduces the incentive for income-shifting without the need for a special and somewhat com-
plex provision.
82 The compressed rate schedule taxes all trust income over $8450 at 39.6%. I.R.C.
§ 1(e) (1994); Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 I.R.B. 18, § 3.01 (inflation adjustment).
83 In addition, income shifting to entities exempt from tax (either de jure or de facto)
would remain. These include charities, foreign businesses, and businesses with loss
carryforwards.
84 "Because it is high-income taxpayers who have the biggest incentive and the best
opportunity to use special tricks to exploit tax-rate differentials, applying the same tax rate
to these taxpayers for all of their income in all years is the most important goal of flat-rate
taxation." Flat Tax 11, supra note 44, at 28 (emphasis added). This is a strange argument
in another respect. It does not say that graduated rates are wrong in principle; it merely
complains that the rich are sometimes able to avoid them. It is not obvious that the best
response to that problem is to change the law so that the rich are always able to avoid
them.
85 See GRAETZ, supra note 47, at 232.
86 FLAT TAx I, supra note 11, at 5.
87 Id. at 6.
88 As others have demonstrated, it is possible to achieve tremendous simplification for
the majority of taxpayers, within the context of a graduated income tax. See, e.g., GRAETZ,
supra note 47, at 259-60; Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpay-
ers: Some Options, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 197-200 (1996) (describing a return-free income
tax system for millions of taxpayers); Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual
Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REv. 121 (1989); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 7, at 246-48 (describing a proposal by Representative Gephardt for an income tax
system that would be return-free for most taxpayers).
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Charles McLure claims another simplification advantage for a
single rate tax system-that it makes surrogate taxation of in-
vestment income more attractive. 9 For example, McLure de-
scribes the treatment of interest payments under the flat tax-
nondeductible to borrowers and nontaxable to lenders-as a "flip-
ping" of current treatment. As long as interest rates adjust to re-
flect the tax regime, taxpayers should be indifferent between the
current rules (of deductibility and taxability") and the flat tax
rules (of no tax consequences), if borrowers and lenders pay the
same tax rate.9 Thus, a flat rate facilitates a most simple tax
treatment of interest payments, under which denying a deduction
to the borrower serves as a surrogate for taxing the lender. Simi-
larly, using a tax on business as a surrogate for a tax on dividends
received by business owners is more attractive if individuals and
businesses are taxed at the same rate.2
The problem with the surrogate taxation case for a single rate
tax is that surrogate taxation can be used even if the rates of the
wage tax are graduated. David Bradford's "X tax" has the same
bifurcated base as the flat tax, but a different rate structure. 3
The X tax has a graduated rate wage tax, and a flat business tax
with a rate equal to the top wage rate. It achieves precisely the
same simplification from surrogate taxation as does the flat tax.
It does so at the cost of arguable unfairness to low bracket owners
of capital, for whom the surrogate business tax rate is higher than
their own wage tax rate.94 If little capital is owned by low bracket
taxpayers, however, and if the equity gains from a graduated
wage tax are deemed substantial, that may be a price worth pay-
ing. In any event, the choice of the flat tax over the X tax as a
means of implementing surrogate taxation must be made on de-
batable equity grounds; both taxes can achieve the same simplic-
ity gains.
89 See McLure, supra note 76, at 289-90. McLure's analysis is consistent with Hall's
and Rabushka's description of the business tax as a surrogate tax on the investment in-
come of individuals: "The interest, dividends, and capital gains received by individuals...
have already been taxed under the business tax." FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 125.
90 I.R.C. §§ 163 (providing for the general deductibility of interest expense, but with
important exceptions), 61(a)(4) (including interest payments in gross income) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
91 See McLure, supra note 76, at 289.
92 See id. McLure correctly notes that the simplicity advantage of surrogate taxation
has nothing to do with the choice between income and consumption tax bases. A flat rate
facilitates surrogate taxation under either tax base. Id.
93 David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them? 39 TAX
NOTEs 383, 385-86 (1988) [hereinafter Bradford III].
94 The X tax reaches correct surrogate tax results, of course, for all capital owned by
top bracket individuals. Even for an individual not in the top wage tax bracket, the
overtaxation under the surrogate tax is minor, if she has large amounts of investment in-
come. In that case, if the investment income were taxed directly to her, most of it would be
taxed in the top bracket.
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B. Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: A Really
Simple Tax
Hall and Rabushka have intentionally passed up the opportu-
nity to make their tax really simple, and they have done so be-
cause they believe a really simple tax would not be fair. The flat
tax is a bifurcated version of a value-added tax.95 It would be pos-
sible to use a plain, nonbifurcated VAT to tax all consumption at a
single rate. Compared to the flat tax, this would have the huge
simplification advantage of not requiring any individual tax re-
turns. Hall and Rabushka concede that a VAT would be a "really
simple tax," even compared to the flat tax, but they reject a VAT
because the absence of exemptions (i.e., the zero bracket of the
wage tax) means it would not be fair. 6 They even say that a tax
without the average rate progressivity created by exemptions
would be unfair.97 Although the difference between a simple VAT
and the flat tax appears to be one of base, it is better understood
as a difference in rate structure. The base of both systems is con-
sumption; the difference is that the bifurcated flat tax applies a
rate of zero on subsistence consumption financed out of current
wages.
Given that many taxpayers will find even a postcard return
daunting, the bifurcation of the base of the flat tax is a major com-
promise of simplicity.98 Having swallowed this camel of complex-
ity in the name of fairness, they are poorly positioned to object to
the gnat of additional complexity associated with graduated
rates.9 9 They can argue that an exemption is fair but graduated
rates are not. The argument must then be waged not over simplic-
ity, however, but over competing concepts of equity. If Hall and
Rabushka are willing to give up the simplicity of a VAT in the
service of their idea of fairness, they cannot hope to convince those
95 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
96 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 55.
97 "[A] value-added tax is unfair because it is not progressive." Id. This is a surpris-
ing claim, given their earlier assertion that proportionality of tax burdens is a "principle of
equity." Id. at 27. Perhaps what they really believe is that fairness requires a tax exemp-
tion for subsistence wages, and that average rate progressivity is a side effect of a subsis-
tence exemption. Or perhaps fairness is not really the main point of bifurcation. In a
question-and-answer section at the end of the second edition, Hall and Rabushka mention
another reason for bifurcation: "If individuals did not file returns, advocates of more gov-
ernment spending could promise voters new benefits without higher costs." Id. at 121.
98 Other commentators have noted that any tax that requires individual returns will
be much more complex-in the view of tens of millions of middle-class taxpayers-than a
VAT or a retail sales tax. See, e.g., GRAETz, supra note 47, at 206; Musgrave, supra note 31,
at 732-33.
99 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 138 (including individuals in the tax collec-
tion process is significantly more complicated than collecting all taxes from businesses, but
taxing individuals at graduated rates does not by itself "contribute any significant
complexity").
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who believe in the fairness of graduated rates that progressive
marginal rates are ruled out by complexity.
It would be easy to convert the flat tax to a tax with the same
bifurcated base, but with graduated rates applied to the wage por-
tion of the base. 0° This approach has been suggested by David
Bradford, and by Charles McLure and George Zodrow. 1°1 If one
believes that that system would be fairer than the flat tax, the
almost trivial additional complexity is not a substantial objection.
C. Simplicity and a Flat Income Tax
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, there is no
convincing simplicity link between the Hall-Rabushka tax base
and a flat rate tax. Even if one is persuaded-in part because of
simplification-that the Hall-Rabushka tax base should replace
the income tax, the question of the rate structure of the wage tax
remains open. A desire for simplification does not dictate the an-
swer. A person who values tax simplification might rationally
support a graduated rate version of Hall-Rabushka. The other
way of unlinking the base and rate reforms would be a flat income
tax. If there is no compelling simplicity-grounded objection to a
consumption base without a flat rate, is there any compelling sim-
plicity objection to a flat rate without a consumption base? The
Hall-Rabushka proposal could be converted to a kind of income
tax by replacing the business tax's expensing of investments with
economic depreciation. Expensing of investments under Hall-
Rabushka is the economic equivalent of exempting the return on
the investments from tax; allowing only economic depreciation
would eliminate the exemption, thus making the system a form of
income tax. Although this form of an income tax could have grad-
uated rates on wages, a flat version of the tax has the arguably
attractive feature of taxing labor income and capital income at the
same rate. Interestingly, for all their emphasis on the importance
of taxing consumption rather than income, Hall and Rabushka
mention partial expensing of investment (presumably with depre-
ciation of the remaining cost) as an acceptable variation on their
1oo It would not, however, be practical to graduate the business tax in a way that made
policy sense-i.e., in accordance with the income levels of business owners. Michael Graetz
questions "why wages but not investment income should be subjected to progressive tax
rates." GRAETz, supra note 47, at 219. Rough justice might be achieved, however, by set-
ting the rate of the business tax equal to the top rate of the wage tax, on the assumption
that most business income accrues to high-income persons. See the discussion supra text
accompanying notes 93-94.
lo BRADFoRD I, supra note 35, at 76-82, 329-34; Bradford III, supra note 93, at 384-85;
McLure & Zodrow, supra note 52, at 72.
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proposal."0 2 Partial expensing results in a hybrid income-con-
sumption tax.1"3
Replacing expensing with depreciation would complicate the
business tax, especially if depreciation deductions are adjusted for
inflation.104 All the increase in complexity would be on the busi-
ness tax side, however. If the main point of simplification is mak-
ing taxes simpler for the typical wage earner-as Hall and
Rabushka suggest it is-then this innovative version of a flat rate
income tax would be almost as simple as the flat tax itself.
D. Summing Up
The flat tax linkage of consumption base and flat rate is not
explained by an overriding concern for simplicity. A true overrid-
ing concern for simplicity would produce some form of consump-
tion tax not requiring individual returns. The flat tax itself has no
significant simplicity advantage over two competing tax systems,
neither of which links a flat rate with a consumption base: the flat
tax base with graduated rates on wages, and a flat rate form of
income tax derived from the flat tax.
VI. CONSUMPTION TAxES, FLAT TAxEs AND Two VERSIONS
OF NEUTRALITY
The two strongest technical arguments for why a consump-
tion tax should also be a flat tax relate to two neutralities. The
first argument is that a cash flow version of a consumption tax
must have a flat rate if it is to achieve neutrality between present
and future consumption. The second argument is that a tax on
labor income must have a flat rate if it is to achieve neutrality
between persons with equal labor endowments but different life-
time earnings patterns. Both arguments are examined in this sec-
tion, as are the implications of those arguments for the unusual
Hall-Rabushka bifurcated tax base, which is neither a traditional
cash flow tax nor a simple wage tax. Although the arguments cre-
ate a stronger link between a consumption base and a flat rate
than the simplicity and efficiency arguments, in the end they are
not persuasive.
102 FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 82 (explaining that partial expensing, rather than full
expensing, would make possible a reduction in the revenue-neutral flat tax rate).
103 See Arnold C. Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF TAXATION 299, 307-09 (Henry Aaron & Michael Boskin eds., 1980).
1o4 Charles McLure rightly points out that although "[tihe idea of replacing expensing
with depreciation allowances is 'straightforward'; implementation of it is not, given our
ignorance of economic depreciation rates." McLure, supra note 76, at 293 n.21.
1999]
Chapman Law Review
A. A Cash Flow Consumption Tax and the Timing of
Consumption
1. The Case for a Flat Tax
Until they were recently overshadowed by the flat tax, the
most prominent proposals for replacing the income tax with a con-
sumption tax followed the cash flow model. 105 The USA Tax is the
leading current cash flow proposal.10o Under a cash flow tax, all
sources of income are subject to the individual tax, but only if con-
sumed rather than saved.
A common argument against the income tax, discussed earlier
in this Article, 1 7 is that it distorts individuals' choices between
current consumption and saving for future consumption. The tax
on investment income drives a wedge between the social return on
investment and the individual investor's return on investment 08
It is not clear that this distortion should be eliminated, when the
cost of doing so is greater distortion of labor-leisure decisions. 09
Assuming the desirability of the goal, however, the distortion can
be removed in one of two ways. A wage tax-which imposes no
tax on investment income-obviously eliminates the wedge, and
thus the distortion. A cash flow consumption tax can also elimi-
nate the distortion, but only if it taxes an individual's consump-
tion at the same rate, regardless of when it occurs. If the tax rate
on future consumption out of savings is higher than the rate on
present consumption, then a cash flow tax shares the income tax's
vice of distorting consumption timing decisions. Living frugally
now, in order to consume at a higher level later, is discouraged by
a progressive cash flow tax.
Suppose a taxpayer earns $30,000 in wages this year (period
1) in a tax-free utopia. After spending $20,000 on her basic needs,
she has $10,000 of discretionary income. She may decide to con-
sume that $10,000 now, or she may decide to invest the $10,000
with an eye toward increased consumption in period 2. If she in-
vests the $10,000 at the going rate of return, it will grow to
$15,000 by period 2. Her choice is between consumption now, or
50% greater consumption later. To put the same point differently,
the choice is between consumption in period 1 of $10,000, or con-
sumption in period 2 with a present value, when viewed from pe-
riod 1, of $10,000.
lO5 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974); DAVID F. BRADFORD AND THE U.S. TREASURY TAX PoLIcY
STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TA REFORM 101-128 (2d ed. rev. 1984) [hereinafter
BLUEPRINTS].
106 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
107 See note 54, supra and accompanying text.
lO8 See supra text accompanying note 54; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 105, at 46-47.
lo9 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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Now suppose there is a cash flow tax, imposed at a flat rate of
20%, with a $20,000 exemption. After spending $20,000 on her
basic needs, the taxpayer has $10,000 of discretionary income. If
she saves none of it, she will pay $2000 in tax, and be able to con-
sume $8000. She may decide instead to invest the entire $10,000.
No tax is currently due if the $10,000 is saved. The $10,000 will
grow to $15,000 by period 2. If her period 2 consumption is subject
to the same 20% tax rate, the savings will enable her to consume
$12,000 in period 2 (after paying a $3000 tax). As in the no-tax
world, her choice is between consumption now, or consumption of
equal present value later. Although the tax has reduced her op-
portunities for both present and future consumption, it has not
distorted the choice.
But now suppose that the rate structure is progressive, so
that if the taxpayer goes on a consumption binge in period 2-
spending the savings on top of her period 2 wages-the marginal
tax rate on her $15,000 dissavings will be 40%. The after-tax con-
sumption from the savings will be only $9000.11o In present value
terms, the choice is between $8000 consumption now, or consump-
tion with a present value of only $6000 later."'
2. The Objections to the Case
If avoiding distortion in the timing of consumption decisions
is the reason one wants a cash flow consumption tax, it has com-
monly been thought that the tax must have a single rate, which
remains constant over time." 2 Notice, however, that graduated
rates in a cash flow tax have two effects, only one of which is objec-
11o This $9000 is only 12.5% more than the alternative of $8000 consumption in period
1. The progressive cash flow tax has driven a large wedge between the 50% social return on
savings and her 12.5% private rate of return. This wedge may have two behavioral effects
on the taxpayer, pushing in opposite directions. The low after-tax return on savings may
discourage her from saving. This is the substitution effect-the substitution of lightly
taxed current consumption for heavily taxed future consumption. But if she is a "target
saver"-i.e., if she is saving in order to be able to consume a specific dollar amount in
period 2-the increased tax burden will cause her to save more to meet her goal. This is
the income effect. Economic theory cannot predict which effect will dominate. The greater
tax burden on future consumption may decrease savings, increase savings, or leave savings
unchanged. The inefficiency resulting from taxation, however, depends solely on the distor-
tion caused by the substitution effect. Thus, a graduated cash flow tax may cause substan-
tial deadweight loss even if the net result of the income and substitution effects is no
change in observed behavior. See ROSEN, supra note 54, at 310-12.
11 By hypothesis, the present value in period 1 of consumption in period 2 is two-
thirds of the amount consumed in period 2.
112 Edward McCaffery goes so far as to say that the potential of a progressive cash flow
tax to penalize savers vis-a-vis consumers makes a progressive cash flow tax "not really a
pure consumption tax." Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxa-
tion, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350 (1994).
Of course, one may support a cash flow tax for reasons that have nothing to do with
neutrality toward the timing of consumption decisions, in which case there would be no
particular reason the tax should be flat. McCaffery, for example, advocates a cash flow tax
for reasons unrelated to timing neutrality; his tax would have graduated rates. Id. at 350-
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tionable in terms of consumption tax theory. The objectionable ef-
fect arises from the fact that graduated rates may tax an
individual's consumption at different rates in different years, if he
consumes at different levels in different years. The other effect is
that if Taxpayer B consistently consumes more than Taxpayer A,
the progressive tax will tax B at higher rates than A. This second
effect is unobjectionable in consumption tax theory, and will be
attractive to many on vertical equity grounds.
What if one wants both to eliminate tax distortions in the tim-
ing of consumption decisions, and to tax higher consumers more
heavily than lower consumers? How then to choose a rate sched-
ule for a cash flow tax, balancing these competing objectives? At
one extreme, suppose people save, and dissave, only for the pur-
pose of smoothing out consumption between high and low income
years. In that case, A's consumption and B's consumption are
both level over time, and B's is always higher than A's. On these
facts, the objectionable effect of graduated rates is not implicated.
A will be taxed at the same rate in all years, B will be taxed at the
same rate (but different from A's) in all years, and neither will be
discouraged from saving by the tax system. The vertical equity
goal of graduated rates can be achieved without distorting the
timing of consumption decisions.
More generally, the choice should be graduated rates if indi-
viduals' consumption patterns are fairly level over time, and if the
differences in lifetime consumption levels among individuals are
large. 113 Conversely, if individuals commonly save to finance
higher consumption levels in the future, and if differences in life-
time consumption levels among individuals are small, the concern
about distortion dominates the desire for vertical equity, and the
tax should have a flat rate.
What is the evidence? Don Fullerton and Diane Lim Rogers
recently have demonstrated-to no surprise-that there is signifi-
cant inequality in the lifetime labor endowments, or human capi-
tal, of Americans. 114 At the tenth percentile of the distribution,
the value of the labor endowment is $387,534; at the fiftieth per-
centile the value is $714,292; and at the ninetieth percentile the
value is $1,218,735.115
53. The leading legislative proposal for a cash flow tax also has graduated rates. USA Tax
Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).
113 This situation is implicit in William Andrews' preference for a progressive con-
sumption tax. He explains that rate graduation is not inconsistent with tax neutrality
between present and deferred consumption, "from an equal-consumer perspective." Wil-
liam D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88
HARv. L. REV. 947, 954 (1975).
114 Although labor endowments are not perfect substitutes for lifetime consumption
levels, they are closely correlated.
115 DON FULLERTON & DIANE Lim ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN? 70
tbl.3-2 (1993). The values are in 1984 dollars. There is also strong evidence that income
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The life-cycle, or permanent income, hypothesis holds that in-
dividuals save and dissave in order to consume fairly evenly over
the years of their lives.116 Although it is not clear exactly how
much consumption smoothing occurs, economists commonly as-
sume that there is sufficient smoothing to make even one year's
consumption a reasonable proxy for lifetime income.117 All this
suggests-although it does not prove-that interpersonal differ-
ences in consumption dominate intertemporal differences, so that
the major fairness benefit from graduated rates justifies the minor
distortion of the savings decisions of those unusual persons who
prefer uneven lifetime consumption patterns.""
Moreover, the nature of the dominant effect of a progressive
cash flow tax on consumption timing may not be objectionable to
most consumption tax proponents. Perhaps the best summary of
the evidence is that savings are used to smooth lifetime consump-
tion-in particular, income from peak earning years is used to fi-
nance consumption in retirement-but that even with this
smoothing, the typical lifetime age-consumption profile is hump-
shaped. That is, consumption peaks in peak earning years, and
declines significantly in retirement." 9 If that is correct, it has an
interesting implication for the effect of a progressive consumption
tax on consumption timing neutrality. If the most common sort of
lifecycle savings defers consumption from a high-income, high-
consumption year, to a low-income, low consumption retirement
year, then a progressive cash flow tax actually creates a bias in
favor of future consumption in the typical case.
Let us return to the previous example of the taxpayer saving
$10,000 in period 1, when the marginal rate is 20%, in order to
finance consumption in period 2. This time, however, let us sup-
pose that even with the savings, consumption is lower in period 2
than in period 1, and the marginal tax rate in period 2 is only 10%.
The $10,000 grows to $15,000 by period 2 and, after paying a 10%
inequality in the United States has increased in recent years. See Lynn A. Karoly, Trends
in Income Inequality: The Impact of, and Implications for, Tax Policy, in TAX PROGRESSIV-
ITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 95 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7,
at 55-58 (data on growing income inequality between 1977 and 1990).
116 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20-31 (1957);
Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function:
An Interpretation of Cross-section Data, in POST-KEYNEsIAN EcONoMics 388 (Kenneth K.
Kurihara ed., 1954).
117 See Michael J. Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS OF
TAX REFORM, supra note 44, at 10, 19 ("consumption in any year may well be a better proxy
for permanent income than is income in that year").
118 This assumes, of course, that one begins by accepting the vertical equity argument
for graduated rates.
119 See generally Orazio P. Attanasio, Personal Savings in the United States, in INTER-
NATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS 57 (James M. Poterba ed., 1994) (providing
a detailed and sophisticated analysis of lifetime income, savings, and consumption, based
on Consumer Expenditure Survey data).
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tax, the taxpayer can consume $13,500. Viewed from period 1,
that future consumption has a present value of $9000, which is
greater than the $8000 period 1 consumption alternative (after
paying a 20% tax on $10,000).
It seems quite probable that the most common effect of a pro-
gressive cash flow tax on consumption timing will be a distortion
in favor of deferred consumption. This distortion would, of course,
still be a violation of consumption timing neutrality, but for those
who support a consumption tax in order to encourage savings, it
should not be objectionable. 120 It may even be an attraction.
There are four additional considerations pointing toward the
acceptability of graduated rates in a cash flow tax, despite the im-
pact on consumption timing decisions. First, the mere fact that an
individual's consumption is not perfectly level over time does not
mean that graduated rates will cause distortions. If tax brackets
are fairly wide-encompassing several tens of thousands of dol-
lars within a single bracket-they can accommodate substantial
variations in annual consumption without subjecting an individ-
ual to different tax rates in different years.
Second, Blueprints for Tax Reform describes a cash flow tax
system in which taxpayers are allowed to opt out of cash flow
treatment for some savings; opting out would result in no deduc-
tion for savings, but also no tax on investment return.'2 ' Taxpay-
ers could use this flexibility to average their consumption for tax
purposes, thus avoiding the distortion that would result from dif-
ferent tax rates applying in different years.1
22
Third, for taxpayers with very unequal consumption levels
within a period of a few years, tax base averaging rules, similar to
the repealed income averaging rules, 123 could be provided.
Finally, there is a strong argument that the goal of applying
the same tax rate to an individual over a period of many years is
quixotic. One Congress cannot bind later Congresses; 124 tax rates
will inevitably change over time as economic conditions, revenue
12o The House-passed "Tax Code Termination Act" calls for elimination of "the bias
against savings and investment." H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. § 3(a)(4) (1998). It seems un-
likely the House Republicans would object strenuously to a tax bias in favor of savings and
investment.
121 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 105, at 110-11.
122 See id. at 112-13.
123 Former I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 141, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117 (1986).
124 Kyle D. Logue offers several suggestions-some of them quite creative-as to how
the government might credibly commit itself to a particular tax policy, if it desired to do so.
Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Govern-
ment Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1181-94 (1996). Logue does not, however,
suggest that Congress use any of these devices to commit future Congresses to a particular
rate structure.
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needs, and congressional attitudes change.'25 This reality sug-
gests that there is no point in enacting a flat tax to pursue the
consumption tax goal of neutrality in the timing of consumption
decisions, because neutrality requires the tax rate to remain un-
changed over decades, and that cannot happen.'26 That impossi-
bility leaves the greater interpersonal fairness of graduated rates
as the only achievable goal; it wins by default.
3. Relating the Case to the Bifurcated Base of the
Flat Tax
The flat tax can be understood as an unusual version of a cash
flow tax, using a look-through model of individuals' investments in
businesses. When an individual invests wages in a business he is
not entitled to a wage tax deduction for making the investment.
He can be viewed, however, as benefitting indirectly from the abil-
ity of the business to expense the assets it buys with his money.12 7
Similarly, when those assets produce business income, the inves-
tor formally pays no tax, but the tax the business pays can be
viewed as paid on behalf of the investor, like a withholding tax.12 8
The clearest case for viewing the flat tax as a kind of cash flow
tax is the wage earner with a sole proprietorship business on the
side. If he takes some of his wages and uses them to buy assets for
his business, the net tax effect will be the same as under a cash
flow tax, if the wage tax and the business tax share the same rate.
The savings from the business tax deduction will offset the taxa-
tion of the wages under the wage tax,129 just as a savings deduc-
tion would offset the tax on wages under a standard cash flow tax.
If he consumes the income generated by the assets, rather than
reinvesting it in the business, that income will be taxable to him
under the business tax, with the same result as if he had been
taxed on consumed income under a standard cash flow tax.
125 See GAErz, supra note 47, at 203-04; C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE 135,
fig.8.3 (1992) (showing changes in average and marginal income tax rates at several income
levels from 1955 to 1990).
126 Strictly speaking, avoiding distortion between present and future consumption does
not require that the tax rates actually be the same in both years. It requires only that at
the time the taxpayer makes the decision to consume or save, he believes the rate will be
the same in both years. The history of changes in United States income tax rates, however,
would give taxpayers under a cash flow tax little reason to have that belief.
127 See Stein, supra note 45, at 107.
128 This is how Hall and Rabushka explain the business tax: "The business tax is a
giant, comprehensive withholding tax on all types of income other than wages, salaries,
and pensions .... As a result, all income that people receive from business activity has
already been taxed. Because the tax has already been paid, the tax system does not need to
worry about what happens to interest, dividends, or capital gains after these types of in-
come leave the firm.. .. " FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 61.
129 This result assumes the taxpayer has enough other business income to make the
deduction for the cost of the assets fully useable.
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If the flat tax base is analogized to a cash flow tax, must the
tax be flat in order to achieve tax neutrality toward the timing of
consumption? Perhaps surprisingly, a variation on the flat tax,
with a flat rate for the business tax but graduated rates for the
wage tax, has consumption timing neutrality. 3 ° For example,
David Bradford's 'X tax,"131 which has a flat business tax at the
same rate as the top wage tax rate, features consumption timing
neutrality. Any combination of a graduated wage tax and a flat
business tax has consumption timing neutrality, regardless of the
relation between the business tax rate and the top wage tax
rate. 132 The X tax approach of setting the business tax rate equal
to the top wage rate seems the most attractive option, however, on
the assumption that most business income accrues to high-income
persons.3
Suppose the wage tax has graduated rates, with the top wage
tax rate equal to the business tax rate of 40%. Consider again the
wage earner with a business on the side. He has $100 of wages,
subject to the wage tax at the rate of 25%.13 If he opts for current
consumption, he will pay a tax of $25, and consume $75. If he
chooses instead to invest those wages in the business, he will be
able to spend $125 on business assets. Deducting $125 from the
40% business tax generates a tax savings of $50, so the after-tax
cost of the investment is $75, which equals the wages he has avail-
able to invest after paying the $25 wage tax. Viewing the first
year in isolation, the net effect of the two taxes is a 25% negative
tax: the burden of the lower rate wage tax is more than offset by
the benefit of the deduction against the higher rate business tax.
The assets generate income at the normal rate of return in
the economy-say, 10% for one year. One year later, the business
has the assets, still worth $125,"13 and the $12.50 income from the
assets. The taxpayer then decides he wants to devote the entire
$137.50 to consumption, which requires selling the assets. He will
have to pay the 40% business tax on the entire $137.50,136 so the
13o See Bradford HI, supra note 93, at 385-86.
131 Id.
132 For that matter, the combination of a wage tax and a flat business tax has con-
sumption timing neutrality no matter what rate structure is chosen for the wage tax. See
infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 93-94 (discussing surrogate taxation under the
X tax).
134 This rate is the average or effective rate on the $100 wages. The analysis does not
depend on what marginal rate structure produces that average rate.
135 For simplicity of illustration, the example assumes the assets suffer no economic
depreciation.
136 The $12.50 income is obviously subject to tax, since it was not reinvested in busi-
ness assets. The other $125 is subject to the business tax because the assets were sold, and
proceeds from the sale of plant and equipment are subject to the business tax (unless rein-
vested). See FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 63. In income tax terms, an expensed asset has a
zero basis, so the entire amount realized on its sale is taxable gain.
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amount he will be able to consume is $82.50. Using a 10% dis-
count rate, the present value in the first year of $82.50 in the next
year is $75. The result is that the combination of the 25% wage
tax and the 40% business tax does not distort the consumption
timing decision. Whether he consumes in the first year or the sec-
ond year, the present value of the consumption will be $75.
The result in the example generalizes. The present value of
the after-tax consumption will always be simply the amount of the
wages, reduced by the effective wage tax rate in the year the
wages were earned. 137 Since the present value of the consumption
depends only on the wage tax burden in the year the wages were
earned, it is unaffected by consumption timing. As a result, con-
sumption timing neutrality will exist in this bifurcated tax system
no matter what rate structure is chosen for the wage tax. What is
crucial to consumption timing neutrality in this system is that the
rate of the business tax be flat and constant over time. 18 As long
as the business tax rate is flat and constant, the present value of
consumption depends on the effective wage tax rate in the initial
year, and on nothing else-not the structure of wage tax marginal
rates (whether flat, progressive or regressive), not on the relation-
ship between wage tax and business tax rates, and not on wage
tax rates in later years.
Whatever the merits of the consumption timing neutrality ar-
gument for a flat cash-flow tax of the usual sort, the argument
places no limits on the rate graduation of the wage tax portion of
the Hall-Rabushka bifurcated tax.
137 Suppose a taxpayer earns wages W. The amount he can invest in his business,
after taking into account both the wage tax rate (wt) and the business tax rate (bt) is:
W(1-bt ) "
This amount will grow at the annual rate of r, for the n years that the taxpayer postpones
consumption. Thus in year n the investment will have grown to:
W[ i-wt ) (l+r').
If it is converted to consumption in year n, the amount available for consumption after
imposition of the business tax will be:
W( 1-bt ) (1+r)Y(1-bt)
From the perspective of the first year (in which the wages were earned), the present value
of that future consumption is:
(--r 1 l---t) (lr)-(1-bt) .
Simplifying the expression, (1+r)' and (1-bt) drop out, and the present value is just W(1-
wt). Obviously, this value is independent of n (i.e., the year in which consumption occurs).
138 Only if bt is flat and constant over time does (1-bt) drop out of the present value
formula. See supra note 137.
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B. A Wage Tax and Neutrality among Earnings Patterns
1. The Case for the Link
One argument in favor of a consumption tax is based on the
similarity between a consumption tax and a one-time tax on en-
dowment. Blueprints, for example, suggests that "endowment"-
defined as a person's wealth at the beginning of his working years,
including the value of his human capital-is a good measure of
lifetime ability to pay tax, and thus a theoretically attractive tax
base. 3 9 Problems of valuation and liquidity make an endowment
tax impractical, but a consumption tax more nearly approximates
the effects of an endowment tax than does an income tax.
For ease of illustration, consider a situation in which the only
wealth is human capital. 40 Imagine two persons with equal value
human capital. Each wants to consume an equal amount in each
year. Under an income tax they will bear different lifetime tax
burdens despite their equal endowments, if they have different
patterns of lifetime earnings.' Under a wage tax, however, two
persons with equal human capital endowments will bear equal
lifetime tax burdens regardless of the timing of their earnings, if
the same tax rate applies to all earnings of each. Therefore, one
who favors a wage tax out of a desire to impose equal tax on equal
human capital endowments will want the tax to have a single
rate, constant over time.
A simplified example illustrates the point. Taxpayers C and
D begin their working years with no wealth except the present
value of their future earnings. There are only two earnings peri-
ods-present period 1 and future period 2. C will earn $100,000 in
period 1 and nothing in period 2; D will earn nothing in period 1
and $150,000 in period 2. The time value of money is such that
$100,000 now and $150,000 in period.2 have equal present values.
Thus C and D have human capital endowments of equal value.
Will they face equal tax burdens under a wage tax? Yes, if the
same tax rate applies to each. At a 20% rate, for example, C will
have $80,000 after tax in period 1 and D will have $120,000 after
tax in period 2. The pre-tax equality of the present value of their
endowments is thus maintained post-tax.'42 If C and D both want
139 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 105, at 36.
140 In this situation the major difference between a consumption tax and a wage tax
disappears; the fact that a consumption tax burdens existing nonhuman capital, while a
wage tax does not (see supra text accompanying notes 30-33), is irrelevant when there is no
wealth other than human capital.
141 A taxpayer whose earnings are front-loaded will have to save to smooth his con-
sumption, and that will subject him to the income tax's double tax on savings. See
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 105, at 37-38. A taxpayer who earns the same amount each year
will not have to save to smooth consumption, and so will avoid the double tax.
142 As the example illustrates, a flat rate wage tax will impose equal tax burdens on
taxpayers who begin their working years with future earnings of equal present value, even
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to smooth their consumption over the two periods, C will have to
save and D will have to borrow. The saving and borrowing have
no tax consequences under a wage tax, and so do not disrupt the
equality between the two taxpayers.14
But what if the tax has graduated rates, so that C pays tax at
an average rate of 20% on $100,000, and D pays at an average
rate of 30% on $150,000? Then C's after-tax endowment is still
$80,000, but D's is only $70,000 (the present value of period 2 af-
ter-tax earnings of $105,000). The general point is that if two tax-
payers have equal-value endowments, but one has greater
bunching of wages, a graduated rate wage tax will impose a heav-
ier burden on the taxpayer with the bunching.'4
2. Relating the Case to the Bifurcated Base of the Flat
Tax
The essence of the above analysis is not changed by moving to
a world with old capital, other than human capital, in existence at
the time a new tax system is introduced, and by imposing the bi-
furcated base of the flat tax rather than simply a wage tax. If the
business tax is imposed at the same rate as the wage tax, and if
the rate of each tax remains fixed over time, the combined effect of
the business and wage taxes will be to tax equal endowments
equally-regardless of how those endowments are divided be-
tween human and other capital, and regardless of the timing of
earnings from either form of capital.
This conclusion can be illustrated by modifying the above ex-
ample, so that D has no human capital endowment, but is en-
if their earnings patterns are different. However, economists commonly define a person's
labor endowment as the present value of potential future earnings, were one to work the
maximum possible number of hours. See FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 115, at 22-23.
This definition includes the value of all time available to a person-whether devoted to
paid labor, to unpaid labor, or to leisure, and values all that time at the person's wage rate.
Under this definition of endowment, even a flat rate wage tax will not impose equal bur-
dens on two persons with equal endowments, if one decides to devote more time to paid
labor than the other, or if one chooses to work at his highest available wage rate and the
other does not.
There is another, closely related, difference between a wage tax and an actual one-time
tax on endowment. An actual endowment tax, as defined by Fullerton and Rogers, would
involve no efficiency cost. It would not distort behavior, because it would not be based on
behavior. See id. at 39. The wage tax, by contrast, imposes an efficiency cost because it
distorts the choice between paid labor and untaxed uses of time.
143 Each will be able to consume $48,000 in each period. C has $80,000 after-tax in
period 1. If he consumes $48,000 and saves $32,000, the savings will grow to $48,000 by
period 2. D borrows and consumes $48,000 in period 1. In period 2 he earns $150,000.
After paying $30,000 tax and $72,000 loan principal and interest, he can consume $48,000
in period 2.
144 See McCaffery, supra note 112, at 351. A taxpayer may have greater bunching of
wages than another taxpayer with an equal-value endowment either because his earnings
occur later in life, as in the example in the text, or simply because his earnings vary more
from year to year.
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dowed with other capital that will earn $150,000 in period 2. The
endowments of C and D now differ both in nature (human capital
for C, other capital for D) and in timing, but are still equal in pres-
ent value. A 20% bifurcated wage-business tax will leave C with
$80,000 after the wage tax in period 1, and D with $120,000 after
the business tax in period 2, thus maintaining post-tax the equal-
ity of the present value of their endowments. The fact that the
wage tax and the business tax share the same flat rate thus could
be explained by a desire to impose equal tax burdens on endow-
ments of equal value.
3. Some Objections
Imposing equal tax burdens on equal endowments is the
strongest argument for a logical link between the Hall-Rabushka
consumption tax base and a flat rate, but even this argument is
subject to important objections. Three objections can be briefly
noted before considering others in more detail. At the outset, the
link is only as strong as the case for equal-tax-on-equal-endow-
ments as a tax policy goal. Blueprints simply assumes the appro-
priateness of the goal,14 without defending it. One who thinks
ability to pay is better determined based on shorter periods than a
lifetime will not be impressed with the goal. 146 Second, any tax
imposed on actual earnings is a poor proxy for an endowment tax,
if equal-endowment taxpayers make different choices about the
extent to which they convert their earnings potential to actual
earnings. The flat tax will impose a much heavier burden on the
taxpayer who realizes his full earnings potential, than on an
equally able taxpayer who works short hours at a low-paying, but
pleasant, job.147 This problem is sufficiently serious to call into
question the entire project of trying to mimic the results of an en-
dowment tax. Finally, the point about the implausibility of con-
stant tax rates over time made earlier, with respect to the cash
flow tax, applies here as well."4 A policy goal whose accomplish-
ment depends on Congress holding the tax rate steady over de-
cades may not be worth pursuing.
145 "If endowment is regarded as a good measure of ability to pay over a lifetime, this
implies that a consumption base is superior to an income base as a measure of lifetime
ability to pay." BLUEPRINTS, supra note 105, at 36 (first emphasis added, second emphasis
in original).
146 "Ultimately, a lifetime view is not likely to hold much sway with legislators."
GRAETZ, supra note 47, at 204.
147 See the discussion, supra note 142.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
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a. The inconsistency of Hall-Rabushka with the
endowment tax rationale
Despite the fact that the endowment tax analysis supplies the
strongest link between their chosen tax base and a flat rate, Hall
and Rabushka do not rely on, or even mention, that analysis.
That omission may be because the endowment tax rationale calls
for a truly flat wage tax-i.e., a tax with no zero rate bracket cre-
ated by exemptions. Consider how taxpayers C and D would fare
under a 20% "flat tax" with a $30,000 exemption. The present
value of C's after-tax wages would be $86,000.149 The present
value D's after-tax wages would be only $84,000.15° D's average
tax rate is higher than C's because of the exemption, and that dif-
ference destroys the equality of the tax burdens. In addition, the
exemption means that an endowment consisting entirely of
human capital is taxed less heavily than an equal-value endow-
ment consisting entirely of other capital. Perhaps Hall and
Rabushka realized that the wage tax exemptions in their proposal
are inconsistent with the logic of the endowment tax analysis, and
so they decided not to rely on that analysis.
Of course, one might believe that equal tax on equal endow-
ments is a worthy goal, but also believe that exempting subsis-
tence wages from tax is even more important. Then the flat tax
might be attractive as imposing at least similar tax burdens on
equal endowments, while also avoiding the taxation of subsistence
earnings.
b. Balancing horizontal and vertical equity concerns
Equal tax burdens on those with equal endowments is purely
a goal of horizontal equity; it says nothing about vertical equity-
the relative tax burdens on those with greater and lesser endow-
ments. Suppose a one-time tax on endowments were practical.
Regardless of rate structure, the system would necessarily impose
the same tax on all persons with the same endowment value, thus
automatically achieving horizontal equity. If one's version of ver-
tical equity were that those with larger endowments should be
taxed at higher rates, a graduated rate structure could achieve
that goal without compromising horizontal equity. There is no
logical inconsistency in favoring both equity goals-equal tax on
equal endowments in the name of horizontal equity, and progres-
sive rates in the name of vertical equity. If a true endowment tax
were feasible, then there would also be no technical inconsistency.
149 $100,000 wages (receivable immediately), less $14,000 tax (20% of $70,000 taxable
wages).
15o The tax would be $24,000 (20% of $120,000 taxable wages). The after-tax wages of
$126,000 would have a present value of $84,000.
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In moving from a true endowment tax to a consumption tax
substitute, however, a technical inconsistency emerges. The task
for one who favors both goals is to find the best compromise be-
tween them. The question is whether graduated rates for the
wage tax would do more good in terms of vertical equity than
harm in terms of horizontal equity.'5 ' To a large extent, the an-
swer depends on empirical information about the distribution of
wages, among persons and over time. 15 2
If everyone at any given level of lifetime labor endowment had
the same lifetime earnings curve, there would be no horizontal eq-
uity objection to graduated rates. Each member of the group
would bear the same lifetime tax burden regardless of the rate
schedule. It is not necessary that the lifetime earnings curve for
each member of the group be flat in order to obviate the horizontal
equity objection to graduated rates; it is only necessary that the
curve be the same for each member of the group.
It is easy, then, to state the two extreme cases. If there are no
variations in earnings patterns within endowment levels, but
there are large differences between endowment levels, rates
should be graduated. On those facts, graduation would not inter-
fere with horizontal equity, and would contribute significantly to
vertical equity.'53 At the other extreme, if everyone has the same
level of endowment, but the timing of earnings differs greatly
among individuals, there should be a flat rate. On these facts, ver-
tical equity would be a nonissue, and horizontal equity would re-
quire a flat rate. Which of these extremes is closer to the real
world? As mentioned earlier, Fullerton and Rogers have docu-
mented the existence of large differences in the human capital en-
151 Graduated rates for the business tax are not possible under the Hall-Rabushka sys-
tem, because the system makes no attempt to assign business income to particular busi-
ness owners. FLAT TAX I, supra note 11, at 60-61.
152 A complete analysis would also require information about the distribution of other
forms of capital. However, human capital tends to dwarf other forms of capital, even to-
ward the high end of the endowment distribution. For example, David Bradford has calcu-
lated that "if a male with the 90th-percentile position in the discounted-income [i.e., human
capital endowment] ranking received at age 40 the 90th-percentile inheritance, the effect
would be to increase his lifetime wealth by about 4.2%; at the 95th-percentile position (by
interpolation), 3.6%." BRADFORD I, supra note 35, at 173.
153 There is a qualification. It is theoretically possible that graduated rates could back-
fire in terms of vertical equity. Suppose there are just two endowment groups-high and
low-and that they have very different lifetime earnings curves. Members of the high
group earn $100,000 in period 1 and nothing in period 2. Members of the low group earn
nothing in period 1 and $120,000 in period 2, which has a present value of $80,000 in
period 1. With graduated rates, the low group may face a higher lifetime tax burden than
the high group, which would be perverse. The chances of this being a serious problem in
the real world are remote. As the example illustrates, the backfiring is likely to occur only
if there are tremendous differences in the timing of earnings at different endowment levels.
Although Fullerton and Rogers found that the earnings of different endowment groups do
peak at different ages, the shapes of the curves are not so different as to make backfiring a
major concern. FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 115, at 28 fig.1-3.
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dowments of Americans. 54 To my knowledge there are no studies
of differences in the timing of labor income within endowment
levels.'55 It seems plausible, however, that differences in the tim-
ing of earnings within endowment levels are minor compared to
differences in endowment levels. If that is true, then one who fa-
vors flat rates for horizontal equity and graduated rates for verti-
cal equity, might well decide the vertical equity concern
dominates-at least enough to justify moderate rate graduation.
That decision would be reinforced by the possibility of lessening
the impact of graduated rates on horizontal equity by wage aver-
aging provisions. 56
VII. CONCLUSION
A flat rate imposed on a bifurcated wage-business tax base is
a defensible compromise among simplicity, efficiency, and fairness
objectives in tax system design. There is nothing magic, however,
about that particular compromise. Other than political expedi-
ency, there is no good reason for considering the base and the rate
of the flat tax as a take-it-or-leave-it package. A single-minded
concern for efficiency cannot justify the linkage of base and rate,
because the flat tax does not remotely resemble the tax an effi-
ciency purist would propose. Nor can an overriding desire for sim-
plicity explain the base-rate connection. A version of the Hall-
Rabushka model with a graduated wage tax would be nearly as
simple as the flat tax, as would a version of the Hall-Rabushka
model converted into a flat rate income tax. The argument for
linking a consumption base and a flat rate in order to achieve tax
neutrality between present and future consumption is problematic
even for a standard cash flow tax, and the argument has no appli-
cation to the bifurcated wage-business tax.
The endowment tax analysis is unique in suggesting a logical
connection between the Hall-Rabushka base and a flat rate, but
the connection will not persuade those who do not believe equal
tax on equal endowments is an important and achievable policy
goal. The most serious problem is that the logical connection ad-
dresses only horizontal equity, whereas tax system design must
consider vertical equity as well. Those who favor graduated rates
on vertical equity grounds are likely to find the horizontal equity
case for a flat tax overwhelmed by the vertical equity case for
graduated rates.
The terms of the tax reform debate should be changed. The
issue should not be the merits of the flat tax. Instead, there
154 See supra text accompanying note 115.
155 Fullerton and Rogers emphasize that their study does not consider differences
within groups. FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 115, at 26-27.
156 See supra text accompanying note 123 (discussing consumption averaging and in-
come averaging).
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should be two debates-one on a consumption base versus an in-
come base, and the other on a flat rate versus graduated rates. In
the end, this separation of the issues is inevitable. The emphasis
on flatness has worked well in attracting public attention to tax
reform, but it would be naive to suppose that the base issue can be
kept hidden long enough for the flat tax to become law. If flat tax
proponents are to succeed, they must eventually convince the pub-
lic not only that flat is better than graduated, but also that a con-
sumption base is better than an income base.
When public attention finally does focus on the base issue, the
flat taxers may find that their political acumen in linking a con-
sumption base to a flat rate is matched only by their folly in the
choice of form for a consumption tax. With the high visibility of
the wage portion of the tax, and the near invisibility of the busi-
ness portion, the base can be easily portrayed by opponents as
simply a wage tax. So portrayed, it is an easy target for populist
complaints that a millionaire living off wealth (such as Steve
Forbes himself) would pay no tax, while his chauffeur and his gar-
dener would pay substantial tax. 5 7 In fact, owners of old capital
would bear a substantial burden under the business tax, but it is
probably impossible to convince the public of that reality.
For all their political savvy, the advocates of the flat tax may
have made a crucial mistake in proposing a consumption tax in a
form involving no personal tax on investment income. Although
the USA Tax never caught on with the public because it lacked the
attention-getting feature of a flat rate, the public is probably more
open to an unlimited deduction for savings than to an exemption
for investment income. Not taxing investment income sounds like
an undeserved windfall for the idle rich, but an unlimited deduc-
tion for savings sounds like a just reward for the thrifty middle
class. 5 ' The most saleable proposal for fundamental tax reform
may be a flat version of the USA Tax, but it has yet to find a
champion.
157 See Ernest S. Christian, How Much Simplification Is Enough? Is a Returnless Tax
Realistic? 73 TAX NoTEs 1481, 1491 (1996) (citing example of a Rockefeller and his gar-
dener); Bob Minzesheimer, Key for Forbes Plan is Outsider Status, USA TODAY, Feb. 5,
1996, at A6 ("Forbes' plan means a millionaire who lives off dividends and interest pays
less tax than his chauffeur."); Patrick J. Buchanan, A Flawed Flat Tax and the Way Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at A19 (Bill Gates would pay no tax following an early retire-
ment, but Microsoft employees would pay tax.). Slemrod and Bakija speculate that the flat
tax will "fail a simple 'sniff test' of Americans accustomed to a personal tax on all income,
who will find that a tax that appears to be on labor income only just doesn't smell right."
SLEMROD & BAKIiA, supra note 7, at 250 (emphasis added).
158 "While the Armey Flat Tax gives providers of labor less power to choose [how much
tax they pay] than the current system, the Nunn-Domenici Tax gives them more." Alice G.
Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices, 33 SAN DIGo L. REv.
1355, 1416 (1996). If taxpayers prefer feeling empowered to feeling trapped, they will pre-
fer a cash flow tax to a wage tax.
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